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Abstract  
 
The relation between company longevity and its performance is undeniable; however the 
relationship between sustainability and performance remains the subject of multiple studies 
which seem to confirm a positive link. But what type of relationship exists between a firm’s 
longevity and sustainability management? In this paper, we demonstrate that the adoption of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles explains this link. Therefore, sustainable 
development policies can create a rampart wall which protects firms against crisis through its 
three pillars (environmental, social and economic) and thus limit the number of enterprises 
which go bankrupt. This rampart wall would be even more effective if the principles of 
sustainable development which companies adopt were guided by a suitable mix of soft law 
and hard law. 
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 I. Introduction  
Increasing profits has been a truism for firms since the beginning of the industrial revolutioni. 
Obtaining good financial performances was generally more important than worrying about 
how these results were reached. However, several factors have changed this rule: a series of 
environmental catastrophes, bankruptcies due to flaws in ethics or governance, an increase of 
sustainable development practices, as well as the rise of shareholders’ engagement. Over the 
last decades, the multiplication of crises (financil, economic, social, food and climate) have 
showed that the prosperity and welfare of firms cannot be dissociated from social and 
environmental contexts. Thus, more and more companies have decided to incorporate 
sustainable development principles, referred to as “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) 
into their strategy. For firms which want to grow, or just thrive and survive in a period of 
economic crisis, when the rate of companies going bankruptcy rate of companies is strongly 
increasing, various long-term contributions such as human, financial and natural resources 
(including materials and energy) are necessary. Today, after a recession and with an economy 
which is having difficulties rebooting itself,  shouldn't the objective of firms consist in 
ensuring their own long-term viability, by maintaining a durable access to financial, social 
and human resources ? In other words, what relation exists between the sustainability and the 
performance of firms, but also between their longevity and their sustainability? Moreover, 
putting forward the existence of a strong relation between the longevity and the sustainability 
of firms should make it possible to show that the int gration of CSR in the strategy of firms 
will give them a stronger aptitude of surviving in a changing environment and crisis. 
 
II. Is there a relationship between longevity, sustainability and performance ?  
The link between the performance of a company and its longevity is obvious. Indeed, only 
high-performing firms over a long period are able to overcome an evolving environment, the 
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risks of market and crisis. Thus, centenary firms represent a minority that share, whatever the 
branch of industry, some common characteristics and values that we try to highlight. In 
parallel, many studies have investigated the relationships among social performance, and 
financial performance (Scholten, 2008). In particular, the meta-analysis of Wu (2006) made 
the synthesis of 121 empirical studies and proved th  positive link between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) even if the results strongly 
depend on the type of measures chosen: “market-based measures are weaker predictors of 
CSP than other financial measure and, perceptually b sed measures reported a stronger CSP-
CFP relationship than performance based measures”. Taking into account the apparently 
positive relation between CSP and companies' financial performance, we then consider the 
link between longevity and sustainability. 
 
A. Explanatory factors of the firms’ longevity 
Studies attempting to explain longevity of firms (and identify the explanatory factors) are 
relatively few, in comparison to the importance of the economic issues which arise from 
understanding this phenomenon. Moreover, research is ma nly focused on the lifespan of new 
firms because of their high bankruptcy rate in the first years. In France, 320.000 companies 
are created on average each year, but 33% disappear at the end of the first three years and 
only 50% exceed five yearsii. Studies explaining the longevity of companies over s veral 
decades are scarce, even if some authors like Geus (1997), Simon (1998), and Collins and 
Porras (2004) have made it possible to identify a certain number of characteristics, that we put 
into six categories: 
* a strong company culture based on ethical, human, or social values. This culture, initiated 
by its creator, is a determining factor for the future life of the firm. The stronger it is, the 
longer it will survive him, and resist change from managers. One of the signs of the cultural 
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strength of a firm is expressed through its governance and in particular the stability of 
management. Moreover, this stability of management pro ects the shareholders from short-
term earnings management practices. We can generally observe it in family-held companies, 
but also in several big firms listed on stock markets. For example, L’Oréal had only five 
CEOs in one century, all recruited by internal promotion; 
* a relevant and fair valuation of human capital. On a company level, the collective human 
capital also includes not only individual human capital but also the capital resulting from 
interactions between individuals. This valorisation requires companies to invest continuously 
in the development of individual and organisational competences, to remunerate the 
employees equitably but also to interest them in the firm’s profits. It results in increased 
competitiveness, commitment and loyalty of employees, which are a crucial source of the firm 
value’s creation; 
* a capacity to rapidly adapt to change. This reactivity is closely related to the company’s 
culture. It results from a long term vision, close monitoring of the internal and external 
environments (in order to perceive the evolution of customer needs), an important innovation 
policy, a flexibility in how resources are allocated (for example in order to define priority 
projects, or to pull out of activities) and a latitude left to managers for developing new 
activities with strong potential, even if they are far from the core activity of the firm. For 
family-held companies, this reactivity is explained partially by their financial independence 
which enables them to be more focused on the long ru ; 
* a controlled growth and financial prudence. These two elements are based on a long term 
vision of the target markets and firm's performance. Thus, perennial companies grow in 
stability, i.e. by privileging investments financed by internal funds.   
They place greater importance on performance over longer periods, rather than performance 
which provides short-term earning management practices, and on the conservation of good 
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financial health (in particular by respecting strict ratios of debt). For example, in 2000, 
Bouygues Telecom (via its founder Martin Bouygues), contrary to France Telecom and 
Vivendi Universal, refused to acquire a license of 3rd generation mobile telephony (UMTS) 
due to the  price tag (4.9 billion euros) which would have obliged the company to re-examine 
its development plan and to be massively financed by ebts as was France Telecom. Finally, 
this price was re-examined in 2001 and fell to 619 million euros plus a royalty of 1% of the 
incomes generated by UMTS, and the duration of the license was lengthened from 15 to 20 
years. These new conditions were more acceptable for Bouygues Telecom which financed the 
operation by capital increase. This vision of a controlled growth is much more present in 
family-held firms, because it exists a certain moral duty to continue what their ancestors 
created; 
* strategic alliances with customers, suppliers or other firms, in order to create synergies, to 
explore new markets or to diversify; 
* a good governance, i.e. a balance of power between th  principal stakeholders of firms; 
shareholders, board members, managers and other employees, in order to guarantee that no 
actor can extract benefits to the detriment of others. In particular, the more the property is 
disseminated between a large number of shareholders, th  more the top managers (CEO and 
others) are likely to manage the company in their own interest. Indeed, the managers have 
objectives and temporal horizons which are different from those of the shareholders. As they 
have a privileged access to information, they can use it in order to realize their personal 
objective. In addition, managers are also able to support certain investments compared to 
others, according to their preference and their risk (Charreaux, 1991). Good governance has 8 
major characteristicsiii : “it is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and i clusive and follows the rule of law. It 
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ensures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that 
the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making”.  
In fact, these elements are closely dependant. It does not make it possible to precisely measure 
the impact of each factor and limit the range of the conclusions of univariable studies on 
firms' long-term performance and the reasons for their longevity. Indeed, the most powerful 
companies in the field of human capital show good performances in terms of innovation, 
growth, governance and they also have a strong culture. 
 
B. What is the relationship between sustainability and performance?  
Faced  with the environmental risks that are currently occurring worldwide (climate change, 
dwindling natural resources, drastic loss of biodiversity, natural and industrial disasters, etc) 
and the pressure of public opinion, some companies have recently integrated sustainable 
development into their strategy, which includes three pillars: economic, social, and 
environmental. This brought about the concept of “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) as 
a manifestation of the principles of sustainable development (or sustainability)iv. The 
implementation of a CSR approach does not basically modify the objectives of the company, 
but adds a number of constraints on how to make that profit (respecting future generations) 
and how to distribute it (between employees and shareholders).  
On a practical level, the voluntary adoption of additional constraints, related to CSR, and not 
governed by the rules or standards of an industry, results either in: 
* a real commitment of the company which promotes crtain values, 
* a “marketing” or “strategic” approach aimed at stakeholders with the aim of improving 
company performance or justifying it. Indeed, the firm can use sustainable development to 
attract consumers (e.g., with fair trade), current a d potential employees (e.g., a charter on 
integration of handicapped workers), governments (e.g., to win tenders), suppliers (by 
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negotiating quality or prices), or shareholders. In the last case, as CSR is reflected in the 
search of long-term performance, it can be used to justify, for example, short-term financial 
results below the expectations of investors. 
Thus, whatever the reasons firms adopt CSR, the question remains about its impact on their 
performance. Indeed, increasing numbers of investors are not only analyzing the financial 
performance of firms but are also assessing how these firms face their social responsibilities 
(Barnett and Solomon, 2006). According to stakeholder theory, the greater the satisfaction of 
all stakeholders involved the better the control of the implicit costs of the company resulting 
in a higher financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997). A firm is thus required to be 
held "accountable" for its social performance, in addition to its financial performance 
(Gössling, 2003). However, according to Friedman (1970), CSR leads to expropriation of 
shareholders profits, for the benefit of the community. In addition, non-profit maximization 
for the firm involves a loss of efficiency for the firm as a whole. 
To clarify this debate, numerous empirical studies have documented an association between 
corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). Several 
meta-analysis (Wu, 2006; Maron, 2006; Margolis & Walsh, 2003) show that the relationship 
between CSP and CFP seems positive. However, their syntheses relate to periods before the 
year 2000. Cohen and Winn (2007) and Schubert and Lg (2005) specify that although the 
Bruntlandv report (1987) is considered the high point in the awareness of CSR by firms, 
stakeholders as well as financial analysts, it is only at the beginning of the years 2000,that 
sustainable development became installed as a major issue of corporate government. Firms 
have had to take into account the shift in value systems of its shareholders, its employees, its 
customers…, etc, by implementing the social and enviro mental objectives of all its 
stakeholders. Henceforth, the meta-analysis Margolis, Elfenbein & Walsh (2008)vi, but 
especially that of Van Beurden and Gössling (2008) seems more relevant insofar as they are 
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primarily focused on studies completed between 1990 and 2007 and take into account these 
changes of societal values. They show that the majority f studies found a positive 
relationship between CSP and CFP. While in these various studies, the results are often 
mixed, it is mainly because of performance measures and methodological problems, 
especially as social and financial performance are endogenous. The social performance of 
firms is generally understood through pollution indices, reputation, social rating agencies such 
as KLDvii, the content analysis of their annual report, their philanthropic activities, or 
inclusion in a market index called “socially responsible” such as the DSI 400 for the USA 
(Decock-Good, 2001). Some researchers such as Belu (2009) even propose DEAviii  indices 
reflecting a measure of the commitment by firms to the practices of sustainable development 
(or sustainability). The financial performance includes measures resulting from accountancy 
(e.g., return on investment or return on assets) and others such as market (price or stock 
return). The relationship is much more significant for social performance with indices of 
reputation, and for financial performance with accounting measures. Besides the intensity of 
the stronger relationship, measures derived from accounting have the advantage of providing 
a more relevant measurement of the firm's economic performance. The only disadvantage is 
that they are more prone to managerial manipulation (McGuire et al., 1988).  
These measures, which are the basis of differences observed in the results, lead us to question 
the concept of firms' long-term performance, that financial performance alone can not capture. 
Besides these performance measures, the industry in which a firm belongs must be taken into 
account in the intensity of the positive relationship between sustainability and performance. 
Indeed, firms operate in different industries and must face social, environmental and financial 
concerns which are quite distinct. A bank will not have the same concerns in terms of 
sustainable development as a petrochemical company. However, most studies cover several 
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industries and tend to mask the effects of a specific industry. As proposed by Chand (2006), 
these studies on the relationship between CSP and CFP should focus on a single industry.   
This positive relationship between sustainability and performance is increasingly shared by 
professionals, as shown in the study of McKinsey-BCCC (2008)ix in which two-thirds of the 
managers and three-quarters of investment professional  interviewed in U.S. believe that CSR 
creates value for shareholders, in a stable economic environment.   
 
C. Longevity and sustainability  
The empirical studies show that longevity and sustainability are positively related to the 
financial performance of the firm, even if the intesity of the relation varies with the 
measurement of selected performance. In fact, this p enomenon is explained rather simply 
owing to the fact that when one examines in detail the explanatory criteria of the longevity of 
the companies, one realizes that five of the six factors underlie principles resulting from CSR: 
a strong corporate culture based on values, a relevant and fair valuation of human capital, a 
controlled growth and financial prudence, strategic alliances with the stakeholders, and a good 
governance.  
One can thus wonder whether the majority of centenary companies are not quite simply 
guided by simple principles of ethics and management, l ading them to seek controlled 
growth while respecting the men who contributed to their success. This integration in their 
genes of certain principles of CSR explains surely part of their longevity. 
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III. Sustainability like a rampart against crises ? 
Economic crises weaken companies. Many are those which end up filing for bankruptcy and 
cease their activity. In France, company failures increased by 21.3% in the first quarter of 
2009 compared to the same period of 2008, in spite of the reinforcement of preventive 
safeguardsx. In fact, History teaches us that any economic crisis involves questioning 
established models, by putting forward their defects; incompatibility with the evolving 
environment, lack of flexibility and various other dysfunctions. But the crises also provide an 
opportunity for making radical changes which would be more difficult to implement during 
stable periods, because economic agents are reticent about change (consumers, firms, 
employees, etc). The support measures for the economy (revival programs), then set up by 
governments in the majority of countries, are then as much an opportunity to facilitate the 
changes induced by the crisis by mitigating their harmful effects on companies and 
consumers. We will see, in this part, the impacts of the crisis on the failure of firms and the 
role that concept of sustainability can play to mitiga e their effects. 
 
A. Impact of the crisis on company failure 
Any crisis results in an increasing number of company f ilures, owing to the fact that it affects 
their effectiveness. These impacts materialize at the following levels: 
* economic (i.e. whether products correspond to the market). It results in a fall in sales 
(following the fall of consumption) or a structural f ll in turnover, because of the behavioral 
change of the consumers. General Motors going into bankruptcy in June 2009 resulted from 
the inadequacy of its products (mainly the vans as well as off-road vehicles and sports cars) 
for the American automobile market, whose demand had c nged with the rise in the price of 
gasoline in 2008, then the crisis ( American consumers now prefer less expensive, more 
economical cars); 
 
 
11 
* organisational. This crisis has been both an indicator of organizational dysfunctions and 
forced firms to reduce their costs, given the drop of their turnover. This cost reduction 
inevitably requires a review of their mode of production (including work organization), 
logistics, as well as inventory management. Organisational dysfunctions also relate to the 
governance mechanisms, such as risk control or executiv  compensation, which are in such 
challenging times followed closely by the press; 
* financial. Crises result in a more or less strong fall in the firm's financial performance. 
Companies faced with a lack of liquidity, must file for bankruptcy, or even cease their 
activity. This phenomenon raises two issues; on the on  hand the vision of investors 
performance (a decrease in short-term performance following a crisis does not mean the 
company cannot be profitable in the long-term), on the other hand, it is at the time when firms 
need the banks most that they stop lending, which forced the government to set up a credit 
Mediator, despite of the commitment of the French banks to continue funding the economyxi, 
particularly SMEs, after their rescue by the State. Indeed, “in 9 months (November 2008 - 
August 2009), over 15,000 firms have complained to the credit Mediator and the flow of new 
cases has remained stable despite the summer break. 85% of cases were accepted, 
representing an outstanding credit of 2.91 billion eurosxii.” 
 
B. Sustainability and crisis  
Besides the economic measures (including recovery plans) implemented by most 
governments around the world, the issue of structural reforms to be adopted to prevent 
recurrence of such crises remains. The public debate focuses on various topics such as 
regulation of the financial system, corporate governance, the social behavior of firms, 
particularly with regard to layoffs and relocations, tax havens, tax fraud, etc. 
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If a new financial system regulation is inevitable, it may be insufficient because of 
globalisation, the ingenuity of individuals and the complexity of products, will sooner or later 
bypass it or divert it. In addition to this new financial regulation it seems necessary to 
imagine, a real behavior change, in particular in ba ks, to prevent a crisis like subprime 
recurring. Sustainable development policies can guide the evolution of these behaviors and 
become a rampart against crises, through its three pillars (environmental, social and 
economic) as strong enforcement of CSR principles would allow :  
* to reduce the occurrence of crises or their scope. Indeed, the subprime crisis is due to banks 
that have lent money to insolvent households and which then securitized those loans. 
However, good governance would have allowed banks to have allocated these funds to better 
control the risks taken by limiting this variety ofcredit, as well as the sale of the toxic 
securitized products, and for the other banks, to limit their exposure to such products. The 
next crisis will surely be about energy as is suggested by the mid-2008 increase in oil prices. 
There is an urgent need to take strong measures to r duce the consumption of fossil fuels and 
to use renewable energy as a worldwide substitute , as advocated by supporters of sustainable 
development; 
* to better resist crises. Indeed, highlighting thelink between longevity and sustainability of 
firms shows that the integration of CSR into their strategy, would give them a greater capacity 
for survival in a changing environment and thus help them resist crises. Moreover, the 
subprime crisis has highlighted that firms rated for their good governance ultimately did better 
than others. This argument extends equally to the need to strengthen the governance of banks. 
In fact, this idea may seem simplistic, since the implementation of CRS policies in firms is 
not new, it is either a voluntary step or an application of laws. In France, article 116 of the 
Law on New Economic Regulations, known as NRE (2001), requires publicly traded 
companies to achieve social and environmental reporting. But, the auditors are just required to 
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review the sincerity of non-financial information disclosed and not their compliance with 
statutory obligations. The subprime crisis confirmed the shortcomings of current approaches 
of CSR  with firms based mainly on a declarative system with constraints and a myriad of 
references , which make it possible for firms to build “compliance, avoidance or manipulation 
strategies” (Scholten, 2008).  
The case of large banks worldwide is symptomatic, with the bankruptcy of their system of 
governance including the level of the risk control and remunerations. Moreover, in France, the 
large banks say they advocate CSR and disseminate sustainable development indicators 
according to the NRE, but a detailed analysis of their practices reveals that their adhesion to 
the principles of sustainable development remains superficial (mostly just talk). Indeed, the 
search of short-term profitability after the abyssal losses due to this crisis resulted in a 
tightening of the credit conditions by which SMEs are suffering and an increase in their 
market activities (for example, 1/3 of incomes and 50% of profits before tax of BNP Paribas, 
in the second quarter of 2009, come from its investm nt bankxiii ). We could also mention “the 
bonus scandal” that the French government has seized on, as well as the UK regulator, and the 
presidency of the European Unionxiv. Finally, their actions against exclusion, poverty 
alleviation and microcreditxv remain marginalxvi. By comparison, 20% of outstanding 
microcredit comes from commercial banks in developing countriesxvii.   
These remarks raise the question of the manner in wh ch it would be possible to encourage 
companies to adopt the principles of sustainable dev lopment. In the financial area, hard law 
is necessary for two reasons: because of systemic risk, on the one hand, and its limited ability 
to regulate itself, on the other hand. Indeed, it is n banking that governance dysfunctions are 
greatest (including the control of risks and rewards). For the remaining firms, a mix of hard 
law and soft law seems more appropriate. Indeed, the law has the advantage of forcing all 
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economic agents to comply, but if it is too specific, it may be quickly ineffective due to its 
lack of flexibility.  
A more efficient path in the field of sustainable dvelopment would be to use the law to set 
standards (such as requirements for all companies to publish sustainable development 
indicators) and let social bodies (NGOs, consumers, mployees, business…) the task of 
explaining these standards (the choice of indicators in our examplexviii ) and how they are 
implemented. Many citizens want, for example, the law Grenelle II (article 83), currently 
under discussion, to include the requirements of sustainable development in all firms, while 
providing an easier implementation for SMEsxix, and not just those that employ more than five 
hundred employees, whose total assets exceed 43 million euros. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Compliance with the policies of corporate sustainability would increase productivity, 
effectiveness and efficiency that encourage innovati n, but it would also create savings and 
thus improve firms' performance and consequently their longevity. In addition, it would allow 
in some cases to attract capital thanks to the improvement of the company’s reputation with 
investors and banks and to facilitate access to new markets. In this context, the emergence of 
crises and their intensity will be lower as companies would continue to make decisions that 
take into account environmental and social factors. The emergence of laws on the application 
of standards in the field of sustainable development heightens the efficiency of decision 
making and reduces the temptation for companies to reduce commitment to social 
responsibility, since it is not directly productive. But due to globalization sustainable 
development policies are not the prerogative of some countries and firms to avoid distortions 
of competition thus they have no real impactxx on the environment. 
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FR0000131104-713743  
xiv http://www.e24.fr/economie/monde/article129784.ece/Sommet-europeen-sur-les-bonus.html 
xv http://www.lamicrofinance.org/content/article/detail/23538?PHPSESSID=168869 
xvi Extract from the 2007 CSR report BNP Parisbas: "The partnership with Adie based on several axes: a 
provision of a credit line of EUR 5 million, a parti l assumption of the residual risk of default and  contribution 
towards the running costs of Adie rising with 350 000 euros." In parallel, its outstanding loans increased, in the 
first half of 2009, of 53.4 billion euros in real estate and 13.6 billion euros to support the professionals and 
entrepreneurs (source: boursier.com). Moreover, BNP Parisbas does not assume completely the residual risk 
resulting from this credit line used by Adie, which is all the more surprising when one considers thate 
repayment rate of micro credits are better than other types of credit.    
xvii According to Sébastien Duquet, CEO of PlaNet Finance France. 
xviii  See for example indicators of Global Reporting Initiative (http://www.globalreporting.org/Home). 
xix The Association for Sustainable Development of the Higher Council of the Order of Chartered Accountants, 
(CSOEC) also provides that the publication of these indicators will be done in the notes to financial statements. 
For companies not publishing annexes to the annual statements, this information or actions will be presented 
collectively at the level of professional branches.  
xx According to Greenpeace, the curve of global emission  of greenhouse gases is now increasing steadily despite 
the Kyoto Protocol. This protocol, implemented in 2005, had been ratified by 175 countries except the United 
States. Moreover, emerging or developing countries are exempted from quantified commitments under the 
Treaty ratified by them, like China, India and Brazil.  
 
